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大股东侵害与上市公司资产评估偏差

2003-10-15分类号:F276.6

【作者】周勤业  夏立军  李莫愁
【部门】上海证券交易所   上海财经大学会计学院   上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院
【摘要】Using the data of the abstracts of asset valuation reports disclosed during 2001 and 2002 by the listed companies of Shanghai Stock Exchange,this paper investigates the relationship between the tunneling motivation of large shareholder and the bias of asset valuation.Our result shows that,when the listed companies receive the asset to be valuated,the value increase rate of asset valuation is significantly higher in the transaction with large shareholder than it in the transaction with other parties,implying that the tunneling behavior of large shareholder through manipulating the asset valuation is prevalent.
【关键词】上市公司  大股东侵害  评估质量
【基金】
【所属期刊栏目】统计研究
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